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ALONE AND OUT OF EXCUSES: THE TENTH
CIRCUIT'S REFUSAL TO APPLY FEDERAL RULE OF
EVIDENCE 407 TO PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS
EVAN STEPHENSON*
I. INTRODUCTION
In 1993, the Advisory Committee on the Federal Rules of Evidence (the
Committee) decided to resolve a circuit split regarding the applicability of Federal
Rule of Evidence 4071 (Rule 407) to product liability actions.2 Rule 407 governs the
admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures in federal court.
Subsequent remedial measures are defined as "postaccident warnings, safety precautions, repairs, design changes, changes in procedure," or any other improvements that, if taken previously, would have made the event that caused the harm less
likely to occur.3
By 1997, most circuits had applied Rule 407 to product liability actions to
exclude evidence of subsequent remedial measures, but the U.S. Courts of Appeals
for the Eighth and Tenth circuits had declined to do so.4 To unify the federal courts
in this matter and to supersede the anomalous decisions of these two circuits, the
Committee voted to reject the highly unusual position of the Tenth Circuit on this
issue and to amend the rule.5 The Eighth Circuit's refusal to exclude evidence of
subsequent remedial measures in strict liability actions under Rule 407, unlike one

* Law Clerk to the Honorable John Marshall Rogers, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit,
2005-2006. B.A., George Mason University, 2002; J.D., University ofVirginia School of Law, 2005. Many thanks
to Professor Kent Sinclair for his insightful comments and to Nathan K. Davis, Esq., of Snell & Wilmer, L.L.P.,
for inspiring this piece.
1. The current version of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 provides:
When, after an injury or harm allegedly caused by an event, measures are taken that, if taken
previously, would have made the injury or harm less likely to occur, evidence of the subsequent
measures is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a defect
in a product's design or a need for a warning or instruction. This rule does not require the
exclusion of evidence of subsequent measures when offered for another purpose, such as
proving ownership, control, or feasibility of precautionary measures, if controverted, or
impeachment.
FED. R. EvlD. 407.
2. See Minutes of the Advisory Comrm. on FederalRules of Evidence 3-4 (1993), availableat 1993 WL
761151 [hereinafter Minutes].
3. See Randolph L Bums, Note, Subsequent Remedial Measures and Strict Products Liability: A
New-Relevant-Answer to an Old Problem, 81 VA. L. REv. 1141, 1147 (1995); FED. R. EVID. 407.
4. The Eighth Circuit, when applying Rule 407, affirmed a district court's judgment and approved of its
ruling admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures. See Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n,
552 F.2d 788, 793-95 (8th Cir. 1977). The Tenth Circuit did the same in Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Service,
Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1331 (10th Cir. 1983). AfterMoe v. AvionsMarcel Dassault-BreguetAviation,727 F.2d 917,
933-34 (10th Cir. 1984), however, the Tenth Circuit subsequently began applying relevant state evidence rules on
the issue of the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures. See, e.g., Wilmer v. Bd. of County
Comm'rs, No. 92-3389, 1993 U.S. App. LEXIS 19650, at *3-*5 (10th Cir. July 26, 1993) (applying Kansas
evidence law and citing Moe); Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1410 (10th Cir. 1988) (applying Kansas
law and citing Moe); Romine v. Parman, 831 F.2d 944, 945 (10th Cir. 1987) (citing Moe for the proposition that
"[t]his court has indentified [sic] one instance in which an evidentiary question is so dependent on a state
substantive policy that state law must be applied," and noting that state law is applied to determine the admissibility
of evidence of subsequent remedial measures).
5. See infra Part IV.C.
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of the grounds relied upon by the Tenth Circuit, derived purely from its reading of
the pre-1997 rule's language.6
Federal courts hearing product liability actions always sit in diversity and apply
state substantive law,7 but, unlike any other circuit, the Tenth Circuit declined to
apply Rule 407 to product liability actions by invoking Erie Railroadv. Tompkins.8
Erie established that in diversity actions federal courts must apply state substantive
law. 9 In Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-BreguetAviation,' ° the Tenth Circuit held
that under Erie the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures
should be governed by substantive state policy and that, if contrary state policy
existed, Rule 407 could not be applied by a federal court sitting in diversity." As
a result, the federal courts of the Tenth Circuit do not generally apply Rule 407 to
product liability actions.12 Instead of applying3 Rule 407 across the board, these
courts have used relevant state evidence rules.1
During its 1993 meeting, the Committee voted on how to respond to this circuit
split.' 4 No Committee member voted to adopt the Tenth Circuit's position. 5 A
majority, however, voted to amend Rule 407 to encompass product liability
actions.' 6 In 1997, the U.S. Supreme Court promulgated the Committee's
amendment and Congress subsequently allowed it to take effect. But in subsequent
product liability actions, the courts of the Tenth Circuit have not given effect to this
amendment.' 7 These courts should apply amended Rule 407 without reservation.
This Article argues that the 1997 amendment to Rule 407 has superseded the
Tenth Circuit's holding in Moe by invalidating the Tenth Circuit's application of

6. See Robbins, 552 F.2d at 793-95.
7. See Moe, 727 F.2d at 932 (observing that "there is no federal products liability law" and "products
liability action[s] are governed by the law of the state...").
8. See David Wadsworth, Forma Scientific v. Biosera and the Admissibility of Evidence of Subsequent
Remedial Measures in Strict Liability Actions, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 757, 781 (2000) ("[O]nly the Tenth Circuit
has held the exclusionary rule [of Rule 407] substantive."). See generally Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64
(1938).
9. Erie, 304 U.S. at 78.
10. 727 F.2d 917 (10th Cir. 1984).
11. Id. at 931-33; see Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1410(10th Cir. 1988) (following Moe);
see also Erie, 304 U.S. at 78 ("Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the
law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.").
12. See infra Part IV.A. Sometimes federal courts within the Tenth Circuit do apply Rule 407. For instance,
it has been applied when there is no finding of a conflict between it and a state evidence rule or when a party has
failed to object to its use. See, e.g., Gray v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 82 F. App'x 639, 646-47 (10th Cir. 2003);
Enfield v. A.B. Chance Co., No. 97-3377, 1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 6318, *8-*9 (10th Cir. Apr. 7, 1999); Mehojah
v. Drummond, 56 F.3d 1213, 1214-15 (10th Cir. 1995); Hull v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 812 F.2d 584, 587 (10th
Cir. 1987). The Tenth Circuit later said of Hull:
Mhis Court has on at least one occasion applied Fed. R. Evid. 407 in a diversity case involving
a strict liability claim. Hull, however, also involved negligence claims, and it is unclear to which
claim the court was referring when it held the evidence of remedial measures was inadmissible
under Rule 407 to prove "culpable conduct."
Call v. State Indus., No. 99-8046, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17732, *19 n.7 (10th Cir. July 24, 2000) (citation
omitted).
13. See infra Part IV.A.
14. See infra Part V.C.
15. See infra Part V.C.
16. See infra Part IV.C. As discussed in Part IV.C, several options were proposed, one of which was the
Tenth Circuit's Erie approach.
17. See infra Part V.A.
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Erie to Rule 407. In Moe, the Tenth Circuit assumed that Rule 407 did not directly
address the issue before the court.'8 In all fairness, prior to 1997, Rule 407 did not
clearly instruct courts to apply the rule in product liability actions. 9 As a result, the
Tenth Circuit engaged in a vague and freewheeling choice-of-law analysis guided
by nothing other than the general policy underlying Erie;20 that is, federal courts
apply state substantive law in diversity actions to discourage forum shopping and
avoid the inequitable administration of the laws. 2' Since December 1, 1997,
however, the language of Rule 407 has unmistakably and directly covered product
liability actions. Federal courts may choose to apply a contradictory state evidence
rule only if Rule 407 flunks the test of Hanna v. Plumer, meaning that amended
Rule 407 is unconstitutional. 22 The Tenth Circuit is not alone in facing difficulties
applying Erieor Hannawhen state and federal evidence rules conflict. In 1995, the
Fourth Circuit illustratively floundered when dealing with the Erie-Hannaset of
doctrines.23 Such difficulties offer an explanation for the Tenth Circuit's failure to
acknowledge that Moe has been superseded by amended Rule 407, despite several
opportunities where it could have done so. 24
Although analyzing Rule 407's relationship to product liability litigation has been
a popular sport for decades, commentators have usually focused on such topics as
whether admitting evidence of subsequent remedial measures in product liability
actions will influence tort law,25 the merits of various proposed amendments to Rule
407 (before 1997),26 and whether the pre-1997 version of Rule 407 should have
applied to product liability actions in federal court.27 One commentator has
addressed the Erie-Hannaimplications of applying amended Rule 407 to product
liability actions in the context of California law and has urged the Ninth Circuit to
adopt the Tenth Circuit's rationale.28 Since the 1997 amendment, no academic

18. See infra notes 155-160 and accompanying text.
19. See Andrea Lynne Flink, Note, Admissibility of Subsequent RemedialMeasures Evidence in Diversity
Actions Based on Strict ProductsLiability,53 FORDHAML. REv. 1485, 1490 (1985) (stating that, before the 1997
amendment, "Rule 407 [did] not conflict with contrary state products liability law"). Although it is somewhat
awkward to say that Rule 407 did not "conflict" with something that was "contrary," Ms. Flink's wording
adequately conveys the idea.
20. See infra Part 1IB.4.
21. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460,468 (1965) (noting that the "twin aims" of Erie are "the discouragement
of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of the laws").
22. See infra Parts I.B.1-2; see also In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chi., Ill on May 25, 1979, 701 F.2d
1189, 1193 (7th Cir. 1983) ("In such a case the Rules of Decision Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (1976), coupled with the
supremacy clause of the United States Constitution, demands that the [federal evidence] rules apply in federal
court, unless Congress exceeded its powers to regulate federal courts in enacting them.").
23. See generallyKenneth J. Lorge, Note, Hottle v. Beech Aircraft.: Confusion Surrounding the Choiceof
Law in FederalDiversity Actions Persistsas the Fourth CircuitApplies State Evidentiary Law in the Face of a
Conflicting FederalRule of Evidence, 26 Sw. U. L. REV. 135 (1996). See infra Part m.B.3.
24. See infra Part IV.A.
25. See Bums, supra note 3.
26. See generallyMarcie J. Freeman, Comment, Spanning the Spectrum: ProposedAmendmentsto Federal
Rule of Evidence 407, 28 TEx. TECH L. REv. 1175 (1997); Eric L. Vinson, Note, Applying Federal Rule of
Evidence 407 in Strict Liability: A Discussion of Changes to the Rule, 16 REV. LrrlG. 773 (1997).
27. See, e.g., Karen A. DiLisio, Note, The Admissibility of Subsequent Remedial Measures in a Product
Liability Case, 3 PRODS. LIAB. L.J. 222 (1992); Marcia Lyn Finkelstein, Note, Comity and Tragedy: The Case of
Rule 407, 38 VAND. L. REV. 585 (1985); Flink, supranote 19.
28. See Daniel Ogbum Comment, SubsequentRemedial Measuresand the Application of CaliforniaLaw
in a Diversity Action, 39 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 615, 617, 646 (1999).
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commentator has advocated against the Tenth Circuit's continued refusal to apply
the rule in product liability actions.29
Part II of this Article examines the origin, derivation, and purposes of Rule 407.
Part Inexplains the pre-1997 circuit split regarding the applicability of Rule 407 to
product liability actions. Part IV demonstrates that the 1997 amendment rendered
the Tenth Circuit's Erie analysis moot and sets forth further support for the
proposition that the 1997 amendment has superseded Moe. For the reasons
demonstrated, the Tenth Circuit should apply Federal Rule of Evidence 407 in
product liability actions.
II. BACKGROUND: FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 407
This Part briefly explains the origin of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
emphasizing Rule 407. It further discusses the process by which the 1997
amendment to Rule 407 was adopted. Understanding the origin of the Federal Rules
of Evidence, and the painstaking process by which the Supreme Court and Congress
amend them, highlights the importance of the 1997 amendment of Rule 407 and
emphasizes the seriousness of the Tenth Circuit's failure to follow this rule.
A. The Origin and Purposesof FederalRule of Evidence 407
Congress enacted the Federal Rules of Evidence in 1975.30 The rules were the
culmination of a decade-long process that began in 1965."' In that year, Chief
Justice Earl Warren "appointed an advisory committee of judges, practitioners, and
academics, who drafted the original slate of proposed rules. 3 2 Drawing on the
common law of evidence and former attempts at codification, the Committee
delivered a set of proposed rules to Congress in 1972."3 "Congress proved to be a
tough and discriminating audience" as it tinkered with and even deleted scores of
proposed rules. 34 This process lasted years longer than intended; the rules had been
scheduled to go into effect on July 1, 1973, but Congress passed a statute
suspending their effective date until a future act of Congress.35 Congress passed
another statute enacting the rules in 1975.36

29. One lawyer in the Tenth Circuit, however, has done so in two brief articles in practitioner-oriented
periodicals that utilize roughly the same analysis as this Article. See Nathan Davis, Admissibility of Subsequent
Remedial Measures: Bad Law Lurking in the 10th Circuit,23 LUN'S PROD. LIAB. L. & STRATEGY No. 5, at 1
(2004), availableat http://www.swlaw.com/publications/files/LJNarticleNov20O4.pdf; Nathan Davis, Applicability
of C.R.E. 407 in FederalCourt,34 COLO. LAw. 77 (2005), availableathttp://www.swlaw.com/publications/files/
05JanEvidence.pdf [hereinafter Davis, C.R.E. 407]. The author provided research assistance forboth articles cited
in this footnote.
30. GEORGE FISHER, EVIDENCE 3 (2002); see COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
FEDERAL RULES OF EVIDENCE vii (2002) ("Public Law 93-595 (approved January 2, 1975, 88 Stat. 1926) enacted
the Federal Rules of Evidence proposed by the Supreme Court, with amendments made by Congress, to be effective
July 1, 1975.").
31. FISHER, supranote 30, at 3.

32. Id.
33. Id.
34. Id.
35. Act of Mar. 30, 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-12, 87 Stat. 9.
36. See FISHER, supra note 30, at 3.
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Like many of the other Federal Rules of Evidence, Rule 407 codifies a common
law rule of admissibility. Rule 407 excludes evidence of subsequent remedial
measures as proof of an admission of fault. Although Rule 407 ultimately is derived
from the common law,37 two other evidence rule codifications preceded it. The older
of these two codifications, Model Code of Evidence Rule 308, was promulgated in
1942 and read as follows:
Evidence of the taking of a precaution by a person to prevent the repetition of
a previous harm or the occurrence of a similar harm or the evidence of the
adoption of a plan requiring that such a precaution be taken is inadmissible as
tending to prove that his failure to take such a precaution to prevent the previous
harm was negligent.38
Rule 308, therefore, did not contain eventual Rule 407's exclusion of evidence
offered to prove "culpable" conduct.39
The other predecessor of Rule 407 was the 1953 Uniform Rule of Evidence 51 '
The Uniform Rule of Evidence exclusionary rule closely paralleled the pre-1997
version of Rule 407 but differed from Rule 407 in that Rule 407 makes explicit that
subsequent remedial measures may be admitted for any purpose other than to prove
negligence or culpable conduct."'
The exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures serves two purposes:
first, it "prevent[s] the use of evidence that may not be relevant" to the issues of
negligence or culpable conduct; second, it "promote[s] the policy of not deterring
people from making safety improvements."42 As to the first traditional purpose of
Rule 407, evidence of subsequent remedial measures should be excluded because
it lacks probative value in establishing negligence or culpable conduct.4 3 This
rationale shall be referred to as the "relevance rationale."" Making safety
improvements does not admit fault or breach of a duty, "since the conduct is equally

37. See Thais L. Richardson, The ProposedAmendment to FederalRule of Evidence 407: A Subsequent
Remedial Measure That Does Not Fix the Problem,45 AM. U. L REv. 1453, 1454 (1996).
38. MODEL CODE OF EVID. R. 308 (1948).
39. Compare id. with FED. R. EVID. 407.
40. The text of Uniform Rule of Evidence 51 read as follows:
Subsequent Remedial Conduct. When, after the occurrence of an event remedial or
precautionary measures are taken, which, if taken previously would have tended to make the
event less likely to occur, evidence of such subsequent measures is not admissible to prove
negligence or culpable conduct in connection with the event.
Freeman,supra note 26, at 1179 n.31 (quoting UNIF. R. EViD. 51).
41. Of course, the current version of Rule 407 also makes explicit its applicability to strict product liability
actions, unlike Uniform Rule of Evidence 51. Compare FED. R. EVmD. 407 with UNIF. R. EVID. 51.
42. Lev Dassin, Note, Design Defects in the Rules Enabling Act: The Misapplicationof FederalRule of
Evidence 407 to Strict Liability, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 736, 736 (1990).
43. In a classic explanation of this rationale, the Supreme Court noted:
But it is now settled, upon much consideration, by the decisions of the highest courts of most
of the States in which the question has arisen, that the evidence [of subsequent remedial
measures] is incompetent, because the taking of such precautions against the future is not to be
construed as an admission of responsibility for the past, has no legitimate tendency to prove that
the defendant had been negligent before the accident happened, and is calculated to distract the
minds of the jury from the real issue, and to create a prejudice against the defendant.
Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892).
44. For an articulation of the relevance rationale, see id.
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consistent with injury by mere accident or through contributory negligence. 45 In
other words, it does not logically follow that "'because the world gets wiser as it
gets older, therefore it was foolish before.'"" In the words of one commentator,
"Because evidence of a subsequent remedial measure addresses neither the
reasonableness of an actor's conduct nor the foreseeability of risk at the time the
on the issue of fault [or culpable
conduct occurs, courts should exclude
' 47 the evidence
irrelevant.
is
it
because
conduct]
The Advisory Committee Note to Rule 407, however, expresses skepticism about
the sufficiency of the relevance rationale: "Under a liberal theory of relevancy this
ground alone would not support exclusion as the inference is still a possible one. 48
As Judge Weinstein notes elsewhere, "Under the liberal theory of relevancy
embodied in Rule 401, circumstantial evidence of 'subsequent remedial measures'
is relevant on the issue of negligence or culpability. '49 The Fifth Circuit has
impliedly disagreed with the Advisory Committee Note and Judge Weinstein on this
point. Long before the 1997 amendment, in GrenadaSteel Industries v. Alabama
Oxygen Co.,° the Fifth Circuit upheld the exclusion of evidence under Rule 407 in
a product liability appeal relying solely on the relevance rationale.5 Therefore,
whether the relevance rationale justifies Rule 407 is debatable.
Regarding the second traditional purpose of Rule 407, it "rests on a social policy
of encouraging people to take, or at least not discouraging them from taking, steps
in furtherance of added safety."52 This rationale of not deterring safety measures is
referred to in this Article as the "social policy rationale." Admitting evidence of
post-injury safety improvements against defendants at trial would not encourage,
and may discourage, some safety measures.53
[A]ccidents are low-probability events. The probability of another accident may
be much smaller than the probability that the victim of the accident that has
already occurred will sue the injurer and, if permitted, will make devastating use
at trial of any measures that the injurer may have taken since the accident to
reduce the danger.'
The "social policy [rationale] consistently has been recognized as an important
ground for exclusion by the courts. 55 The Advisory Committee Note agrees that the
social policy rationale is more "impressive" than the relevance rationale.5 6

45. FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note.
46. Id. (quoting Hart v. Lancashire & Yorkshire Ry. Co., 21 L.T.R. N.S. 261, 263 (1869)).
47. Richardson, supra note 37, at 1459.
48. FED. R. EviD. 407 advisory committee's note.
49. 2 JACK B. WEINSTEIN & MARGARET A. BERGER, WEINSTEIN's FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 407.03[2], at
407-12 (Joseph M. McLaughlin ed., Matthew Bender 2d ed. 2006).
50. 695 F.2d 883 (5th Cir. 1983).
51. See id.at 889.
52. FED. R. EviD. 407 advisory committee's note.
53. See Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984) ("In either [strict liability or
negligence], if evidence of subsequent remedial measures is admissible to prove liability, the incentive to take such
measures will be reduced.").
54. Id.
55. 2 WEINSTEIN &BERGER, supranote 49, § 407.03[l], at 407-10.1. See generally2 DAVID W. LOUISELL
& CHRISTOPHER B. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE § 166 (rev. vol. 1985).
56. See FED. R. EviD. 407 advisory committee's note.
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The relevance rationale seeks to enhance the truth-seeking mechanism of litigation and may be seen as "procedural."5 7 The social policy rationale, however, aims
to benefit society by guiding litigants' behavior out of court and is "substantive."58
These traditional rationales and the common law exclusion of evidence of
subsequent remedial measures addressed the needs of actions based on negligence,
not strict liability. 59 As courts before 1997 attempted to apply the rule properly to
strict product liability actions, they were forced to try to fit a square peg (Rule 407)
into a round hole (strict product liability actions). The Supreme Court and Congress
intervened and amended the rule in 1997. 0 The resulting amendment unambiguously extended Rule 407 to product liability actions but did not update the
advisory committee notes with a new rationale, or an elaboration of an existing
rationale, to justify the new extension. 61 The 1997 amendment should have settled
the question of Rule 407's applicability to product liability actions once and for all.
But a circuit split regarding the applicability of Rule 407 to product liability actions
still exists due to the Tenth Circuit's continued failure to honor the amended rule.62
It would benefit this discussion to examine the amendment process that produced
the current version of Rule 407.
B. The Amendment Processfor the FederalRules of Evidence
The seriousness of the Tenth Circuit's failure to apply amended Rule 407 can be
fully appreciated only by understanding the lengthiness and rigor of the amendment
process. This Part provides a brief overview of that process.
Proposed changes to the Federal Rules of Evidence undergo a lengthy and
painstaking process. The 1997 amendment to Rule 407, for instance, passed through
numerous procedural checkpoints-including Supreme Court and congressional

57. Douglas McKeige, Note, FederalRule of Evidence 407: Can It Override Conflicting State Law?, 59
TuL. L. REv. 1577, 1584 (1985) (noting that the Seventh Circuit recognizes that "rule 407 also serve[s] the
procedural purpose of excluding irrelevant and prejudicial evidence").
58. Id. at 1583 (noting that the Tenth Circuit has held that "Rule 407 promotes a substantive policy [in that]
it is designed to encourage manufacturers to subsequently repair their product by excluding evidence that they did
so from the resulting law suit").
59. See Dassin, supra note 42, at 743 ("The Rule's exclusion of evidence of subsequent remedial measures
to prove a person's 'negligence or culpable conduct' obviously applies to negligence actions. As such, it conforms
to the historical exclusion of subsequent remedial measures in common law negligence actions." (footnote
omitted)).
60. See infra Part. U.B.
61.

See 23 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & KENNETH W. GRAHAM, JR., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE §

5285.1 (Supp. 2005).
In 1996, the newly revived Advisory Committee on Federal Rules of Evidence revealed its
agenda when as one of its first items of business it amended Rule 407 to add to the list of
impermissible objects of proof "a defect in a product, a defect in a product's design, or a need
for a warning or instruction." The best the Advisory Committee could do by way of justifying
the change was that it "adopts the view of a majority of the circuits." The Committee wisely
decided not to claim that this would encourage drug and other manufacturers not to use
consumers as guinea pigs to test their products; the evidence suggests that despite the
encouragement supposedly provided by the Rule, corporations still refuse to make needed safety
changes after accidents bring defects to their attention because it is cheaper to pay off injured
persons in secret settlements.
Id. (citations omitted).
62. See infra Part III.B.4-IV.A.
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review-before being implemented.63 The difficulty and care inherent in amending
Rule 407 underscores two lessons: (1) the Tenth Circuit should follow the 1997
amendment because it is the product of the best available legal thought and (2) the
1997 amendment represents (or is at least consistent with) the wishes of the highest
legal authorities, the Supreme Court and Congress. 6' An appreciation of the
laborious, careful, and time-consuming nature of the amendment process adds to the
seriousness of the Tenth Circuit's refusal to follow amended Rule 407 in product
liability cases because such refusal to follow the rules reduces the amendment
process to a wasted exercise commensurate with the magnitude of the efforts
expended and has the effect of undermining the authority of the bodies charged with
amending the rules. What follows is an overview of the amendment process.
The Rules Enabling Act (the Act) 65 lays out the amendment process. The Act
authorizes the Supreme Court to promulgate rules or changes in rules governing the
admissibility of evidence in federal courts.66 The rules may be changed for the
purpose of "maintain[ing] consistency ' 67 among the federal courts. The Supreme
Court receives assistance from the federal Judicial Conference and the standing
committee on evidence rules. 68 These bodies recommend changes to the Federal
Rules of Evidence.6 9 After being drafted, suggested changes must be published for
public comment.70 This process "involves a minimum of seven stages of formal
comment and review."' Following the public comment and revision stages, an
authorized body provides the changes to the Supreme Court with an explanatory
note on the rule and a written report explaining the body's action, including any
minority or other views. 72 After the Supreme Court receives and adopts a proposed
change from the Judicial Conference or the standing evidence committee, the Court
must transmit it to Congress within a prescribed time period.7 3 Congress may nullify

63. For a more detailed overview of the rulemaking process than is provided below, see generally Thomas
E. Baker, An Introductionto FederalCourt Rulemaking Procedure,22 ThX. TECH. L. REV. 323 (1991); Frank H.
Easterbrook & Thomas E. Baker, A Self-Study of FederalJudicialRulemaking: A Reportfrom the Subcommittee
on Long Range Planning to the Committee on Rules of Practice, Procedure and Evidence of the Judicial
Conference of the United States, 168 F.R.D. 679 (1996); Freeman, supra note 26, at 1203-07.
64. That the amended rules represent the will of Congress and the Supreme Court follows from the necessity
of Supreme Court promulgation and congressional acquiescence before any amendment can take effect. See infra
notes 65-75 and accompanying text (outlining the process for amending a Federal Rule of Evidence).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
66. The Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072, provides:
(a) The Supreme Court shall have the power to prescribe general rules of practice and procedure
and rules ofevidence for cases in the United States district courts (including proceedings before
magistrate judges thereof) and courts of appeals.
(b) Such rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right. All laws in conflict
with such rules shall be of no further force or effect after such rules have taken effect.
(c) Such rules may define when a ruling of a district court is final for the purposes of appeal
under section 1291 of this title.
67. 28 U.S.C. § 2073(b).
68. See id. §§ 2073, 2074 (2000 & Supp. 2005).
69. See id. § 2073(d).
70. See Federal Rulemaking: The Rulemaking Process, A Summary for the Bench and Bar (2006),
availableat http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/proceduresum.htm [hereinafter FederalRulemaking].
71. Id.
72. See 28 U.S.C. § 2073(d).
73. See id. § 2074.
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any proposed rule or change.74 "From beginning to end, it usually takes two to three
years for a suggestion to be enacted as a rule."7 5
Considering the difficulty and care taken in the adoption of the 1997 amendment
to Rule 407, it would behoove the Tenth Circuit to follow the amendment as
required by the Rules Enabling Act. 76 The failure on the part of the Tenth Circuit
to do so up to this point has arguably called into question the authority of the bodies
that amend the evidence rules, the Supreme Court and Congress (at least for those
who may have noticed this refusal to follow amended Rule 407). If a federal circuit
court ignores the legal effect of a duly-promulgated amendment, as this Article
claims the Tenth Circuit has done, the true rulemaker cannot be said to be the
Supreme Court or Congress; the true rulemaker is the Tenth Circuit.
I. THE EMERGENCE OF THE CIRCUIT SPLIT OVER RULE 407 AND
PRODUCT LIABILITY ACTIONS
Prior to 1997, Rule 407 left "open the question of whether Rule 407 was intended
to include claims based on a theory of strict liability"7 7 such as strict product
liability. The rule forbade the admission of subsequent remedial measures evidence
at trial only if offered to prove "'negligence or culpable conduct,"'" which arguably
are not at issue in strict product liability suits. Nevertheless, the majority of federal
circuits applied Rule 407 in such suits.79 Only the Courts of Appeals for the Eighth
and Tenth circuits declined to do so.80 This Part analyzes the principal lines of
reasoning in the debate over this issue.
A. The Eighth and Tenth CircuitsHeld That Rule 407, by Its Terms, Did Not
Apply to Strict Product LiabilityActions
In Robbins v. Farmers Union Grain Terminal Association,"'the Eighth Circuit
declined to apply Rule 407 to strict product liability actions because, by its own
terms, the rule confined its governance to cases involving "negligence or other

74. FederalRulemaking, supra note 70.
75. Id.
76. See 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2000).
77. See Dassin, supra note 42, at 737.
78. Id.
79. See Cameron v. Otto Bock Orthopedic Indus., Inc., 43 F.3d 14, 17-18 (1st Cir. 1994); Raymond v.
Raymond Corp., 938 F.2d 1518, 1522 (1st Cir. 1991); Mclnnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 244-45 (1st Cir.
1985); Joint E. Dist. & S.Dist. Asbestos Utig. v. Armstrong World Indus., Inc., 995 F.2d 343, 345 (2d Cir. 1993);
Cann v. Ford Motor Co., 658 F.2d 54, 59-60 (2d Cir. 1981); Kelly v. Crown Equip. Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1275 (3d
Cir. 1992); Petree v. Victor Fluid Power, Inc., 831 F.2d 1191, 1198 (3d Cir. 1987); Josephs v. Harris Corp., 677
F.2d 985, 990-91 (3d Cir. 1982); Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848, 857-58 (4th Cir. 1980); Grenada Steel
Indus., Inc. v. Ala. Oxygen Co., 695 F.2d 883,888 (5th Cir. 1983); Hall v. Am. S.S. Co., 688 F.2d 1062, 1066-67
(6th Cir. 1982); Bauman v. Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft, 621 F.2d 230,232 (6th Cir. 1980); Flaminio v.
Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984); Gauthier v. AMF, Inc., 788 F.2d 634, 636-37 (9th Cir.
1986); Wood v. Morbark Indus., Inc., 70 F.3d 1201, 1206-09 (11 th Cir. 1995).
80. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir. 1984); Robbins v.
Farmers Union Grain Terminal Ass'n, 552 F.2d 788, 793 (8th Cir. 1977).
81. Robbins, 552 F.2d at 793 ("Rule 407 is, by its terms, confined to cases involving negligence or other
culpable conduct.").
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culpable conduct. ' 82 The Tenth Circuit agreed in Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying
Service, Inc. 83 "The reasoning behind [the theory relied upon by the Eighth and
Tenth circuits was] that the language of [Rule 407] expressly limits its application
to claims in which fault must be proven, and that because fault is irrelevant under
a theory of strict liability, the rule cannot apply."8 4 Both circuits followed the
California Supreme Court's decision in Ault v. International Harvester Co.85
"which reasoned that because the focus in strict products liability cases is on the
product itself and not on the manufacturer's conduct, the86policy justification for
excluding evidence of remedial measures does not exist.
The majority of federal circuit courts rejected this line of argument. For example,
the majority "reason[ed] that there is no practical difference between strict liability
and negligence in defective design cases."87 The majority also noted that the social
policy argument in favor of not deterring safety improvements seemed as strong in
strict liability cases as it is in negligence cases. 88
The 1997 amendment to Rule 407 superseded the Eighth Circuit's position and
aligned the Eighth Circuit with the majority of other federal circuit courts. The U.S.
District Court for the District of Minnesota (within the Eighth Circuit) recognized
that the Eighth Circuit's position permitting admission of evidence of subsequent
remedial measures under Rule 407 has been superseded by the amended rule. 89 The
district court noted recently that "the precedents on that issue, within this Circuit,
have been superseded by the most recent amendment to Rule 407" of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. 9° Likewise, the Pennsylvania, Colorado, and Washington state
supreme courts observed that the Tenth Circuit's identical position has also been
superseded. 9' The Colorado Supreme Court observed:
Two circuits, the Eighth and the Tenth... did not adhere to the views of the
majority of the federal circuits prior to the amendments to Rule 407. Instead, the
Eighth and the Tenth Circuits followed the reasoning expressed in Ault. These
decisions have now been superseded by the amendments to Rule 407.92

82. Id.; see also Burke v. Deere & Co., 6 F.3d 497,506 (8th Cir. 1993); Donahue v. Phillips Petroleum Co.,
866 F.2d 1008, 1013 (8th Cir. 1989); Roth v. Black & Decker, U.S., Inc., 737 F.2d 779, 782 (8th Cir. 1984);
Unterburger v. Snow Co., 630 F.2d 599, 603 (8th Cir. 1980).
83. 716 F.2d 1322, 1331 (10th Cir. 1983) (noting that Rule 407 cannot apply when culpability is not at
issue); see also Huffman v. Caterpillar Tractor Co., 908 F.2d 1470, 1480-81 (10th Cir. 1990); Meller v. Heil Co.,
745 F.2d 1297, 1299-1300 (10th Cir. 1984).
84. Richardson, supranote 37, at 1467 (footnotes omitted).
85. 528 P.2d 1148 (Cal. 1974); see Forma Sci., Inc. v. BioSera, Inc., 960 P.2d 108, 115 (Colo. 1998)
("IT]he Eighth and the Tenth Circuits followed the reasoning expressed in Ault.").
86. Richardson, supra note 37, at 1467; see also Ault, 528 P.2d at 1150.
87. Richardson, supra note 37, at 1468; Dassin, supra note 42, at 753.
88. See, e.g., Werner v. Upjohn Co., 628 F.2d 848,856-57 (4th Cir. 1980); Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co.,
733 F.2d 463, 469 (7th Cir. 1984); see Richardson, supra note 37, at 1468.
89. Berczyk v. Emerson Tool Co., 291 F. Supp. 2d 1004, 1016 n. 14 (D. Minn. 2003).
90. Id.
91. Duchess v. Langston Corp., 769 A.2d 1131, 1138 n.8 (Pa. 2001); Forma Sci., Inc. v. BioSera, Inc., 960
P.2d 108, 115 (Colo. 1998); Hyjek v. Anthony Indus., 944 P.2d 1036, 1039 (Wash. 1997).
92. Forma Sci., 960 P.2d at 115 (footnotes and citations omitted).

Spring 2006]

FEDERAL RULE OF EVIDENCE 407

The Tenth Circuit, however, had another ace up its sleeve: a choice-of-law rationale
that permits exclusion of subsequent remedial measures evidence under state law,
despite the contrary command of amended Rule 407.
B. The Tenth Circuit'sErie Rationale
In Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-BreguetAviation, the Tenth Circuit held that
the pre-1997 Rule 407 was inapplicable to product liability suits using a theory
grounded in the Erie doctrine.93 This section will first explain the Erie doctrine and
the related principles set forth in Hanna v. Plumer9 and then analyze the Tenth
Circuit's attempt at applying these doctrines.
1. Erie Railroadv. Tompkins and Subsequent Cases
Erie'sholding is an interpretation of the Rules of Decision Act, a federal statute
that seeks to define those situations where state law applies in federal court. 95
According to Erie, the Rules of Decision Act requires federal courts sitting in
diversity to apply the substantive law of the state. 96 The Rules of Decision Act,
however, does not require federal courts to apply state procedural law. Federal
courts in general must use federal procedure. 97
The Supreme Court later refined the test for identifying which state laws must
apply in federal court.98 In GuarantyTrust Co. of New York v. York, the Court stated
that the use of federal rules in diversity cases, as opposed to state rules, should not
change cases' outcomes.99 For a time, outcome determination became the touchstone for choosing between federal and state rules in federal diversity cases. ° The
York variation of Erie was itself refined in the later case of Byrd v. Blue Ridge
Rural Electric Cooperative,Inc. 01 In Byrd, the Supreme Court used a balancing test
to conclude that Seventh Amendment policy required federal courts sitting in
diversity to allow juries to make certain factual findings, even when state law

93. 727 F.2d 917, 931-33 (10th Cir. 1984).
94. 380 U.S. 460 (1965).

95. 28 U.S.C. § 1652 (2000) ("The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of
the United States or Acts of Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil

actions in the courts of the United States, in cases where they apply.").
96. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.").
97. For the notion that Erie requires federal courts sitting in diversity to apply state substantive law but
federal procedural law, see Guaranty Trust Co. of New York v. York, 326 U.S. 99, 105-12 (1945), Hanna v.
Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965) ("The broad command of Erie was.. .that.. federal courts are to apply state
substantive law and federal procedural law."), and Gasperiniv. Centerforthe Humanities,Inc., 518 U.S. 415,427

(1996). Although Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S. 1, 14 (1941), is a Rules Enabling Act case, not a Rules of Decision
Act case, it is nevertheless helpful to take note of its definition of procedure. A rule is procedural "if it really

regulates procedure," meaning "the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law
and for justly administering a remedy and redress for disregard or infraction of them." Id.
98. See Lorge, supra note 23, at 142 ("Subsequent Supreme Court decisions have altered and re-shaped the
original holding of Erie.").
99. See Guaranty Trust Co., 326 U.S. at 109-12.

100. See John Hart Ely, The IrrepressibleMyth of Erie, 87 HARv. L REv. 693,709 (1974) ("But although
it held sway for quite a time, York's outcome determination test seemed overbroad."); Finkelstein, supra note 27
at 591 (noting that "the York outcome determination test endured for some time").
101. 356 U.S. 525 (1958).
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entrusted such findings to judges. 02 According to Professor Ely, "In 1958, in Byrd
v. Blue Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative,Inc., the Court... announc[ed] that Erie
really required that the state's interests be balanced against whatever interests the
federal government might have in the application of its rule."'0 3
The Supreme Court made a final, paradigmatic change in federal-state choice of
law for federal courts in Hanna v. Plumer." Since Hanna, federal-state choice of
law for federal courts has largely stabilized.0 5 Unlike Erie, Hanna primarily
interpreted not the Rules of Decision Act, but the Rules Enabling Act. 0 6 Whereas
the Rules of Decision Act defines situations where federal courts must apply
substantive state law-thus making state law the focus of inquiry-the Rules
Enabling Act seeks to accomplish the inverse: it tells federal courts when federal
rules must be followed. 0 7 The Rules Enabling Act and Hanna,therefore, control the
choice-of-law analysis when a federal court must determine whether a specific
federal rule might control.' 8
Hanna consequently created a test specifically designed for federal rules that
proceeds in two parts.'°9 Each part employs a mutually exclusive avenue of analysis.
First, the court "asks whether the federal rule directly covers the situation before it.
If not, the court then evaluates the choice of law in light of the policies underlying
the Erie doctrine."" 0 This mode of choice-of-law analysis is a standard,not a rule,
and will be referred to in this Article as the "Erie standard." This Erie standard, of
course, is heavily dependent on the balancing test announced in Byrd."' As a

102. See Byrd, 356 U.S. at 536-40; Lorge, supra note 23, at 143-44.
103. Ely, supra note 100, at 696.
104. Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 470-71 (1965).
105. See Thomas D. Rowe, Jr., Not Badfor Government Work: Does Anyone Else Think the Supreme Court
Is Doing a Halfway Decent Job in Its Erie-Hanna Jurisprudence?,73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 963, 966 (1998)
(noting that "since the Court decided Hanna in 1965 it has provided and maintained a reasonably stable, workable,
and sensible structure for analyzing issues in.. .the Erie-Hannaarea of state-federal law choice for federal courts").
106. See Hanna,380 U.S. at 463-64 ("We conclude that the adoption of [Federal] Rule [of Civil Procedure]
4(d)(1)... neither exceeded the congressional mandate embodied in the Rules Enabling Act nor transgressed
constitutional bounds, and that the Rule is therefore the standard against which the District Court should have
measured the adequacy of the service.").
107. For the text of the Rules Enabling Act, see supra note 66.
108. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470-71.
109. See Fasanaro v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 687 F. Supp. 482, 484-85 (N.D. Cal. 1988) (citing and
discussing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471).
110. Id. at 484 (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471).
Erie RailroadCo. v. Tompkins established that federal courts may apply federal procedural law
but must apply state substantive law in diversity actions. Hanna v. Plumer dictates that when
there is a direct conflict between state law and the express language of a federal rule, the federal
rule controls. If there is no direct conflict, however, the court must look to the policies
underlying Erie to determine whether state or federal law governs.
Flink, supra note 19, at 1488-89.
111. In a relatively recent major case involving the Erie doctrine, the Court relied heavily on a mode of
analysis inspired by Byrd. See Gasperini v. Ctr. for the Humanities, Inc., 518 U.S. 415, 431-39 (1996) (citing and
discussing Byrd); see also J. Benjamin King, Note, Clarificationand Disruption:The Effect ofGasperini v. Center
for Humanities, Inc. on the Erie Doctrine, 83 CORNELL L. REV. 161, 164 (1997) ("Gasperiniaffirms Byrd's place
in the Erie doctrine, assuring the legal community of Byrd's continuing relevance."). One commentator expressed
disappointment in this fact. C. Douglas Floyd, Erie Awry: A Comment on Gasperini v. Center for Humanities, Inc.,
1997 B.Y.U. L. REV. 267, 270 ("The Gasperini majority relied centrally on Byrd, which it apparently assumed
should be read as a charter for federal courts to dispense with 'substantive' state rules whenever they conclude that
'essential' federal interests are paramount. However, this question has been subject to considerable debate in the
years following Byrd.").
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further illustration that the Erie standard is in fact a standard and not a rule, it is
worth noting that in Hanna the Supreme Court said that the "typical" Erie analysis
is "relatively unguided,""' 2 which of course means that it is more standard-like than
rule-like.
Second, moving to the other mutually exclusive avenue of analysis under Hanna,
if a federal rule is "clearly applicable" to the issue at hand, "the test [is] whether the
Rule was within the scope of the Rules Enabling Act, and if so, within a
constitutional grant of power such as the Necessary and Proper Clause of Art. V
As Hanna itself said,
When a situation is covered by one of the Federal Rules, the question facing the
court is a far cry from the typical, relatively unguided Erie Choice: the court has
been instructed to apply the Federal Rule, and can refuse to do so only if the
Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie
judgment that the Rule in question transgresses neither the terms of the Enabling
Act nor constitutional restrictions." 4
Clearly applicable federal rules that have been promulgated by the Supreme Court
and Congress therefore must be presumed constitutionally valid "unless they cannot
rationally be characterized as rules of procedure.""' 5 In terms of Justice Harlan's
Hanna concurrence, a federal rule must be deemed procedural, and therefore
constitutionally valid, if it is "arguably procedural.""' 6 This second choice-of-law
test, the Hanna arguably procedural test, is much easier to apply than the Erie
standard because it is a bright-line rule," 7 not a "relatively unguided" ' 8 standard,
and shall be referred to as the "Hannarule."

112. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
113. Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740,748 (1980) (citation omitted); see Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471;
Fasanaro,687 F. Supp. at 484-85; Ogburn, supra note 28, at 616-17, 636-67.
Application of the Hannaanalysis is premised on a "direct collision" between the Federal Rule
and the state law. In Hannaitself the "clash" between Rule 4(d)(1) and the state in-hand service
requirement was "unavoidable." The first question must therefore be whether the scope of the
Federal Rule in fact is sufficiently broad to control the issue before the Court. It is only if that
question is answered affirmatively that the Hanna analysis applies.
Walker, 446 U.S. at 749-50 (citations omitted).
Since there is no direct conflict between the Federal Rule and the state law, the Hanna analysis
does not apply. Instead, the policies behind Erie and Ragan control the issue whether, in the
absence of a federal rule directly on point, state service requirements which are an integral part
of the state statute of limitations should control in an action based on state law which is filed
in federal court under diversity jurisdiction.
Id. at 752-53.
114. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
115. Mclnnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 244 (1st Cir. 1985) (citing Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471).
concurring).
116. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 476 (Harlan, J.,
117. The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Leading Cases,110 HARV. L. REV. 256,257 n.5 (1996) ("Hannaheld
that a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure trumps state law if the Rule is constitutional, within the Rules Enabling Act,
and applicable to the situation at bar. Thus, Hanna created a bright-line rule in favor of the application of federal
procedural rules.") (citations omitted).
118. Hanna,380 U.S. at471.
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When the Hanna rule controls, federal rules are generally upheld." 9 Therefore,
a federal rule that directly covers the issue before the court runs the risk of being
held constitutionally invalid if it cannot rationally be characterized as procedural.
A federal rule that only indirectly addresses the issue at hand, however, need not be
declared constitutionally invalid. The court may use the Erie standard and apply the
state rule in favor of the federal rule with a20mere choice-of-law analysis conducted
"in light of the policies underlying" Erie.
As will be shown below, this distinction is crucial. Prior to the 1997 amendment,
Rule 407 in a strict product liability action could have been tested with the Erie
standard-meaning that it did not have to be declared constitutionally invalid to be
set aside in favor of a state evidence rule.' 2 ' But, in its amended form, Rule 407
must always be tested by the Hanna rule. 22 In other words, if it re-decided Moe
today, the Tenth Circuit could reach the same result only by holding Rule 407
unconstitutional.123 At the time of Moe, however, the Tenth Circuit did not have to
hold Rule 407 invalid.
2. A Possible Source of Confusion: Hanna'sMeta-Rule
The Hanna two-step choice-of-law test can be misapplied quite easily if a court
fails to realize that it implicitly contains a choice-of-law rule that chooses between
the Hanna rule and the Erie standard. 2 4 The overall Hanna scheme, therefore,
contains not only its own choice-of-law test for determining when to apply federal
or state law in diversity actions, it also sets forth a choice-of-law test that selects
either the Hannaarguably procedural rule or the Erie standard. This implicit choiceof-law rule in Hanna for choosing between the Hanna rule and the Erie standard
shall be referred to in this Article as the "Hannameta-rule." The Hanna meta-rule
stands apart from both the Hanna rule (meaning the arguably procedural test itself)
and the Erie standard as a means of choosing one or the other. Put another way, the
Hanna meta-rule tells the court whether it should be deciding the choice-of-law
issue based on the Rules Enabling Act (and therefore the Hanna rule) or the Rules
of Decision Act (and therefore the Erie standard).
Such a meta-rule of some kind is necessary, owing to the inherent tension
between the Rules of Decision Act (and the Erie standard) and the Rules Enabling

119. No federal court has ever struck down a federal rule of evidence or procedure under Hanna. Rioux v.
Daniel Int'l Corp., 582 F. Supp. 620,624 (D. Me. 1984) ("It is significant to note that no federal rule of procedure
or evidence has ever been struck down as exceeding Congress' constitutional power."). No federal case in the last
twenty-two years has made this observation from Rioux any less true.
120. Fasanaro v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 687 F. Supp. 482, 484. (N.D. Cal. 1988).
121. This statement contemplates testing the applicability of the pre- 1997 version of Rule 407 in a strict
liability case; of course, the pre- 1997 rule would have been tested under the Hanna rule, not the Erie standard, in
a negligence case in federal court.
122. Amended Rule 407 directly applies in all suits in federal court involving evidence of subsequent
remedial measures.
123. See Walker v. Armco Steel Corp., 446 U.S. 740, 748 (1980); Hanna, 380 U.S. at 470-72; Fasanaro,
687 F. Supp. at 484.
124. The subtleties of the Erie-Hannasystem, one of which is discussed in this subsection, have thrown off
lower federal courts. See Darrell N. Braman, Jr. & Mark D. Neumann, The Still UnrepressedMyth of Erie, 18 U.
BALT. L. REv. 403,405-06 (1989) ("[O]f the many cases since 1974 involving Erie disputes, only a handful have
used an analysis that arguably tracks the Supreme Court's standard....").
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Act (and the Hanna rule). This tension arises from the way that the two statutes
cover highly similar subject matter with inconsistent tests. The Court in Hanna
obliquely substantiated this point: "It is true that both the [Rules] Enabling Act and
the Erie rule say, roughly, that federal courts are to apply state 'substantive' law and
federal 'procedural' law, but from that it need not follow that the tests are identical.
'
For they were designed to control very different sorts of decisions." 125
The Rules of Decision Act directs courts to use state law where it applies, 26 and
by implication denotes the issues governed by federal procedure as the exception
to those situations where state law applies. The Rules Enabling Act is the inverse
of the Rules of Decision Act. It tells federal courts when to obey federal procedural
rules and by implication allows other substantive law to go where federal proceOf course, in diversity actions the substantive law
dural rules cannot or do not tread.
27
will be the law of the state.'
There would be no need to choose between these two statutes if they relied on
the same implementing tests. For instance, if the Erie standard applied to every
determination under the Rules of Decision Act and the Rules Enabling Act, every
case would come out the same way regardless of which statute the court cited as the
basis for its choice-of-law decision. The same would hold true if both statutes relied
on the Hanna rule. But they do not. 128 The Supreme Court has created two distinct
tests to implement these two different statutes.'29
The two statutes' potential to cover essentially the same subject matter, however,
opens the door to considerable confusion. Imagine, for instance, a purportedly
procedural federal rule promulgated by the Supreme Court or enacted by Congress
that has strongly substantive aspects and directly contradicts substantive state law.
As the importance of the social policy rationale for Rule 407 demonstrates, Rule
407 is just such a rule.' 30 Should a federal court use the Erie standard or the Hanna
rule? Arguably, the Erie standard should control because, to the extent that the
federal rule is substantive, the Rules of Decision Act says that state law, not federal
law, should apply. But just as arguably, the Hannarule should apply because, after
all, the rule in question is purportedly (and maybe arguably) procedural. Without
a meta-rule, the existence of two inconsistent tests covering highly similar subject
matter potentially renders the choice-of-law decision arbitrary.
Hanna solves this dilemma with a meta-rule that tells courts when to use the
Rules Enabling Act's Hannarule. As laid out in Part III.B. 1 above, the Hannameta-

125. Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
126. It may seem circular to say that the Rules of Decision Act directs federal courts to apply state
substantive law "where it applies," but that is what the Rules of Decision Act actually says. See 28 U.S.C. § 1652
(2000) ("The laws of the several states, except where the Constitution or treaties of the United States or Acts of
Congress otherwise require or provide, shall be regarded as rules of decision in civil actions in the courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply." (emphasis added)).
127. See Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) ("Except in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the state.").
128. See Hanna, 380 U.S. at 471.
129. See Megan Barbero, Note, InterpretingRule 68 to Conform with the Rules EnablingAct, 57 STAN. L.
REv. 2017, 2032 (2005) ("'The Court in 'Hanna Part n' distinguished the Rules Enabling Act test from the
'relatively unguided Erie choice."').
130. See supraPart l1A (explaining the social policy rationale for excluding evidence of subsequent remedial
measures).
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rule selects for application the Hanna arguably procedural rule whenever a federal
rule clearly controls the issue before the court. This meta-rule, however, selects for
application the Erie standard whenever the federal rule in question does not clearly
control the issue before the court.
Some commentators note that the Court's articulation of this overall scheme in
Hanna has led to confusion and inconsistent decisions in the lower federal courts. 131
A federal court can easily become confused if it fails to acknowledge the existence
of the Hannameta-rule. A court unaware of the Hannameta-rule, unless it invented
or borrowed a different meta-rule, would have no definitive way to determine when
to use the Hanna arguably procedural rule and when to rely on the Erie standard in
cases involving a federal rule with strongly substantive aspects. Such a court might
arbitrarily choose one test or the other. Or, as the Tenth Circuit has arguably done
since Moe,' 32 such a federal court might see no reason to revisit a past precedent
based on the Erie standard that the Hanna meta-rule now requires to be analyzed
under the Hannaarguably procedural rule. As will be seen below, the Fourth Circuit
illustratively committed the former error, and the Tenth Circuit arguably committed
the latter mistake by failing to acknowledge that the 1997 amendment to Rule 407
superseded Moe.
3. The Fourth Circuit Illustratively Overlooked the Hanna Meta-Rule in
Hottle v. Beech Aircraft Corp.
The Fourth Circuit appears to have overlooked the Hannameta-rule in Hottle v.
Beech Aircraft Corp.'33 Hottle was a product liability case in which the Fourth
Circuit assumed for purposes of the appeal that a Virginia evidence rule conflicted
with Federal Rule of Evidence 402.14 Recall that if the Fourth Circuit actually
believed that Rule 402 directly covered the situation before it-and it assumed so
for purposes of the appeal-the court was obligated to rely on the Hanna rule and
either follow Rule 402 or hold it unconstitutional.'3 5 The Fourth Circuit did
neither.'36 Instead, the court recited the Erie standard and the Hanna rule as part of
its statement of the governing law.'
The Hottle court first noted that federal courts sitting in diversity must apply
state substantive law and federal procedural rules. 3 ' Citing Byrd, the Fourth Circuit
stated, "[T]he Supreme Court has also noted that where a state's procedural rule is

131. See Martin H. Redish & Carter G. Phillips, Erie and the Rules of Decision Act: In Search of the
AppropriateDilemma, 91 HARV. L. REv. 356, 366 (1977) ("M'hese varying interpretations of Byrd, together with
the Court's ambiguous analysis of Byrd in Hanna v. Plumer,have been significant factors in creating the confusion
and inconsistency lower federal court decisions after Hanna have exhibited in fashioning a standard for deciding
Rules of Decision Act cases.").
132. See infra Part W.A.
133. 47 F.3d 106 (4th Cir. 1995).
134. Id. at 109 & n.5.
135. See supra Part Ll.B.I.
136. Although, ironically, it mentioned in passing that the Federal Rules of Evidence were validly enacted.
See Hottle, 47 F.3d at 109 ("Accordingly, we, along with other courts of appeals, have held that the Federal Rules
of Evidence, as validly enacted procedural rules, govern in diversity cases.").
137. Id.
138. Id.
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bound up with substantive policy, a federal court is to apply the state rule."' 39 The
court next reviewed Hanna: "Yet, in a more recent case involving a conflict
between Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(d)(1) and a state service of process rule,
the Court rejected the substantive-procedural test in that context and found the
federal rule controlling under the authority of the Rules Enabling Act."'" In other
words, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged that, in Hanna, the Supreme Court
"rejected" (on Hanna's facts at least) the very Erie standard it had just reviewed.
The court therefore understood that two different and inconsistent tests were in
play. The Fourth Circuit then applied
the Erie standard without explaining why it
14
declined to use the Hannarule.'
Hottle thus reveals how federal courts attempting to identify the applicable law
can go astray. The court in Hottle showed no awareness that Hanna tells federal
courts when the Hanna rule, and not the Erie standard, should apply (and vice
versa). The example of Hottle supplies a possible explanation for why the Tenth
Circuit has failed to revisit Moe in light of the 1997 amendment to Rule 407. If the
Tenth Circuit has simply failed to take note of the Hanna meta-rule, as the Fourth
Circuit arguably did in Hottle, that would explain why it sees no need to revisit an
issue ostensibly settled in Moe by application of the Erie standard. Before this
explanation for the Tenth Circuit's position can be demonstrated, the Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Moe must be examined.
4. The Tenth Circuit's Erie Analysis of Rule 407
As noted above, when the Tenth Circuit decided Moe in 1984, the scope of Rule
407 was "ambiguous."'' 42 It left "open the question of whether Rule 407 was
intended to include claims based on a theory of strict liability."' 4 3 As a result of this
ambiguity, the Tenth Circuit was not required to test Rule 407 in 1984 using the
Hanna rule; that is, it was not required to determine whether or not Rule 407 was
unconstitutional. Instead of using the Hanna rule, the ambiguity of Rule 407 in
1984 permitted the Moe court to use the Erie standard by holding that Rule 407 did
not directly cover the issue before it, thereby avoiding any need to strike down Rule
407 to apply state evidence law.'"

139. Id.
140. Id. (emphasis added).
141. See id. at 109-10. As one commentator points out, the Hottle court may have reached the correct
bottom-line result for reasons unrelated to its erroneous decision not to apply the Hanna rule.
A closer look at the Hottle opinion and the state rule may not produce a conflict which would
make the ultimate holding a correct one. Federal Rules of Evidence 401 and 402 are validly
enacted procedural rules that govern even in diversity suits. The proper inquiry in the Hottle
case then becomes whether the evidence is in fact relevant under Federal Rule of Evidence 40 1.
Therefore, if Virginia's rule is substantive, then the introduction of the manual would be
irrelevant under federal law, as well as state law. A closer look at the cases cited in the opinion
may demonstrate that no real conflict exists.
Lorge, supra note 23, at 163.
142. Dassin, supranote 42, at 737; see Rule 407: Subsequent Remedial Measures, 12 TOURO L. REv. 425,
427 (1996).
143. Dassin, supra note 42, at 737.
144. See supra notes 121-123 and accompanying text.
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In fact, the Tenth Circuit used the Erie standard because it had previously held
that Rule 407 did not, by its own terms, "preclude the admissibility of subsequent
remedial measures in product liability actions."14 5 Thus, the Tenth Circuit analyzed
the choice-of-law issue based on the policies underlying Erie.
A more detailed look at the Tenth Circuit's analysis in Moe also reveals that it
applied the Erie standard and not the Hanna rule. Moe held that the Colorado state
rule of evidence at issue in that case, and not Rule 407, should apply for several
interlocking reasons. First, the court attributed importance to Colorado policy. The
court stated, "It is our view that when state courts have interpreted Rule 407 or its
equivalent state counterpart, the question whether subsequent remedial measures
are excluded from evidence is a matter of state policy."'" The state evidence rule
was "so closely tied to the [state] substantive law to which it relate[d]" that it should
control.'4 7 Later in the opinion, the court restated its view that it must "regard" the
content of state law to decide the applicability of Rule 407 to the product liability
action before it.'48 This first reason implies that the Tenth Circuit opted for the Erie
standard. If the court had resolved the issue using the Hanna rule, it would not
matter in the slightest what Colorado evidence policy was (except for purposes of
establishing a conflict with the federal rule). 49 Once a conflict has been established,
the Hanna
arguably procedural rule examines only the federal rule, not the state
50
rule.1
Next the court provided a list of factors supporting its decision, including its
observation that
(a) there is no federal products liability law, (b) the elements and proof of a
products liability action are governed by the law of the state where the injury
occurred and these may, and do, for policy reasons, vary from state to state, and
(c) an announced state rule in variance with Rule 407 is so closely tied to the
substantive law to which it relates (product liability) that it must be applied in a
diversity action in order to effect uniformity and to prevent forum shopping.'15
This list of factors also indicates that the Tenth Circuit relied on the Erie standard.
Although the court considered whether Rule 407 is substantive or procedural, this
inquiry is consistent with use of both the Hanna rule and the Erie standard and
therefore does not reveal which one the Moe court applied. 52 The court was acutely
concerned with forum shopping, uniformity of law, and the lack of any federal

145. Davis, C.R.E. 407, supra note 29, at 78 (citing Herndon v. Piper Aircraft Corp., 716 F.2d 1322,
1328-29 (10th Cir. 1983)).
146. Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir. 1984).
147. Id.
148. See id. at 933 (restating the "'view that the trial court erred in ruling that Fed. Rule of Evid. Rule 407
applies in diversity actions without regard to state law").
149. The Hanna rule asks only whether the challenged federal rule can be rationally characterized as
procedural; this inquiry does not include an analysis of state policy. See supraPart m.B.I.
150. See supra notes 115-120 and accompanying text.
151. Moe, 727 F.2d at 932.
152. See id.; Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 471 (1965) (observing that both Hanna and Erie require
application of federal procedure and state substantive law in diversity actions, but observing that this fact does not
mean that the tests enunciated in these cases are identical).
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product liability law, none of which should be brought up when using the hard-andfast Hanna rule.' 53
As another reason for concluding that the Tenth Circuit applied the Erie standard
and not the Hanna rule, consider the following: although the court claimed that
"[t]he purpose of Rule 407 is not to seek the truth or to expedite trial
proceedings"' 4 and therefore is purportedly not procedural, this observation was
not entered into the Hanna arguably procedural algorithm, which would signal use
of the Hanna rule. To
the contrary, the court merely said that it was "not
155
unmindful" of Hanna.
The Moe court left no doubt at the end of its Rule 407 analysis that it was relying
on the Erie standard. The court held that state law controls the application of Rule
407, and then cited Erie itself. 56 The court stated that the use of Rule 407 in
product liability actions would represent "an unwarranted incursion into the Erie
doctrine."' 157 There can be no doubt, then, that Moe relied on the Erie standard and
not the Hanna rule.
Because the Tenth Circuit did not rest Moe's holding on the Hanna arguably
procedural rule, 5 1 it most likely did not consider Rule 407 and the Colorado state
evidence rule to be in "direct conflict"' 5 -the court apparently believed that the
federal rule did not directly cover the issue at hand. It seems clear from the
decision's dicta, however, that at the time it would have also held Rule 407 invalid
under the Hanna arguably procedural rule. 16° The court suggested that Congress
lacked power to enact Rule 407.161 In sum, the Tenth Circuit's actual holding in
Moe relied on the Erie standard only.
IV. THE 1997 AMENDMENT TO RULE 407 SUPERSEDED
THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S POSITION
Although the 1997 amendment to Rule 407 expressly extends the rule to product
liability actions, the circuit split described above has continued. The Tenth Circuit,
all alone now, still does not apply Rule 407 to product liability cases (or any
diversity cases) as a general matter. Perhaps because the Tenth Circuit has
overlooked the Hanna meta-rule, it has shown no awareness of the 1997
amendment's Erie-Hannaramifications for Moe. This Part demonstrates that the
1997 amendment to Rule 407 rendered Moe's mode of analysis obsolete. Today,

153. See Flnk, supra note 19, at 1490-91 ("The Hannaconflict test establishes the presumptive validity of
federal rules when a federal rule is on point and is within the scope of the Federal Rules Enabling Act, thereby
rendering Erie analysis unnecessary.").
154. Moe, 727 F.2d at 932.
155. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id.
158. See French v. Fleet Carrier Corp., 101 F.R.D. 369,372 n.3 (D. Me. 1984) (noting that "[t]he Moe court
found that the analysis set forth in Hanna... is inapplicable").
159. Moe, 727 F.2d at 932.
160. Id. at 932-33.
161. "'[I]t does not necessarily follow that the Congress, in codifying the law of evidence, may
constitutionally enact a narrow statute governing a single substantive issue in a lawsuit which is otherwise to be
resolved by reference to state law....'" Id. at 933 (quoting 2 D. LOUISELL & C. MUELLER, FEDERAL EVIDENCE §
166, at 264 (1978)).
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Rule 407's applicability in diversity cases may be judged only by the Hanna rule
and not by the Erie standard.' 62 Hanna requires the Tenth Circuit to acknowledge
that Moe is no longer good law and to apply Rule 407 in product liability cases.'6 3
In addition, the minutes of the 1993 Committee meeting show that the 1997
amendment was intended to have the effect of superseding Moe's holding."6
A. The FederalCourts of the Tenth CircuitHave Continued to Follow Moe
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and two federal district courts
within the Tenth Circuit have followed Moe and its progeny rather than the 1997
amendment to Rule 407. In Blanke v. Alexander,65 a 1998 diversity case in tort
concerning a traffic collision (not product liability),' the Tenth Circuit stated in
dicta that Moe is still good law:
We have expressed the view that in a diversity action, when there is a conflict
between Fed. R. Evid. 407 excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures,
except where offered for specified limited purposes, and a contrary state rule
repudiating the rule of exclusion, the state rule controls; the question of
exclusion of subsequent remedial measures is a matter of state policy.'67
Two years after Blanke, in the unpublished product liability appeal of Call v.
State Industries,168 the Tenth Circuit held that it was still "bound" by Moe: "we are
bound by the.. .rule announced in the earlier case of Moe."'' 69 "In diversity actions
involving a strict products liability claim," the court held, "the question of whether
to permit evidence of subsequent remedial measures is governed by state law."17°
In neither Call nor Blanke did the Tenth Circuit consider the Erie-Hanna
7
ramifications of the 1997 amendment to Rule 407. As explained in detail below,' '
the 1997 amendment to Rule 407 renders Moe moot because now the rule directly
applies to product liability cases and therefore may be set aside in favor of a
conflicting state rule only if 72it flunks the Hanna rule-a rule that Moe never
incorporated into its holding.
In a 2003 unpublished product liability appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit took
note of the 1997 amendment. In Gray v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc. , the plaintiff lost
a lawsuit in which she alleged that the drug Accutane caused her depression. The
plaintiff appealed to the Tenth Circuit and claimed that the trial court should have
admitted "evidence [that the defendant had] changed Accutane' s warnings after she

162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.
1984)).
168.
169.
170.
932).
171.
172.
173.

See supra Part III.B.1.
See supra Part IHL.B.1.
See Minutes, supra note 2.
152 F.3d 1224 (10th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1227.
Id. at 1231 (citing Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir.
No. 99-8046, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 17732 (10th Cir. July 24, 2000).
Id. at *18 n.7.
Id. at *18 (citing Wheeler v. John Deere Co., 862 F.2d 1404, 1410 (10th Cir. 1988); Moe, 727 F.2d at
See infra Part IV.B.
See supra Part III.B.4 (demonstrating that Moe in its holding did not rely on the Hanna rule).
Gray v. Hoffman-La Roche, Inc., 82 F. App'x 639, 646-47 (10th Cir. 2003).
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stopped taking the drug."' 74 As it had done twice before in the post-1997 period, the
Tenth Circuit adhered to its long-held position on Rule 407: "In diversity actions
involving a products liability claim, the admissibility of subsequent remedial
measures is a matter of state law."' 175 In the final analysis, however, the court did not
apply Oklahoma evidence law because it discovered that "no Oklahoma law
indicat[es] whether this exclusion applies to products liability suits."' 76 For lack of
a conflict, the Tenth Circuit applied amended Rule 407.177 In its analysis of the 1997
amendment, the court failed to mention any Erie-Hannaimplications for its prior
rulings. 78 It once again overlooked the Hanna meta-rule, in a manner consistent
with the Fourth Circuit's similar error in Hottle.
In 2002, the U.S. District Court for the District of New Mexico (within the Tenth
Circuit) heard a case involving a strict product liability claim and, despite taking
special note of the 1997 amendment to Rule 407, followed Moe.' 79 In Garcia v.
Fleetwood Enterprises, the district court restated the Tenth Circuit's long-held
position: "Pursuant to Tenth Circuit precedent.. .the admissibility of subsequent
remedial measures is a matter of state, not federal, law."' 180 The court then noted that
in 1997 Rule 407 was amended to include product liability cases, but the court
declined to apply the amended rule.' 8' The court did exclude the evidence of
subsequent remedial measures in that case, but only because it found that "New
Mexico Rule of Evidence 11-407 [the State's equivalent of Rule 407] does apply
to product liability cases."' 82 Nowhere did the court question the continuing validity
of the Moe line of decisions. Once again, a federal court overlooked the Hanna
meta-rule and consequently failed to see that the 1997 amendment supersedes Moe
under the Hanna rule.
Finally, the U.S. District Court for the District of Kansas (also within the Tenth
Circuit) has stated in unreported opinions that Moe continues to require that Kansas
evidence law control the admissibility of evidence of subsequent remedial measures
in diversity cases.' 83 The district court in Kansas showed no awareness of the
Hanna meta-rule or the possible Erie-Hannaramifications of the 1997 amendment
to Rule 407.
To recapitulate, the Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit and the federal district
courts for New Mexico and Kansas still consider themselves bound to set aside
amended Rule 407 in product liability actions or, more generally, when the rule
conflicts with "substantive" state evidence law. Of these courts, only the district

174. Id. at 646.
175. Id. (citing Wheeler, 862 F.2d at 1410).
176. Id.
177. See id.
178. See id. at 646-49.
179. See Garcia v. Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 200 F. Supp. 2d 1302, 1303-04 (D.N.M. 2002).
180. Id. at 1303 (citing Moe v. Avions Marcel Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917 (1984)).
181. See id. at 1303-05.
182. Id. at 1305.
183. Wildermuth v. Staton, No. 01-2418-CM, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8034, at *5-*6 (D. Kan. Apr. 29,
2002); Davis v. Mgmt. & Training Corp. Ctrs., No. 98-4175-RDR, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8361, at *5 (D. Kan.
May 30, 2001); Strabley v. Mercy Health Ctr. of Manhattan, Inc., No. 99-2439-KHV, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
21247, at *2 (D. Kan. Nov. 8, 2000).
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court in New Mexico took note of the 1997 amendment to Rule 407.184 None,
however, saw any Erie-Hannaramifications of this amendment for the Moe line of
decisions.
B. The Effect of the 1997 Amendment of Rule 407 on the Tenth Circuit'sErie
Analysis
As discussed above, the Tenth Circuit used the Erie standard when it conducted
its Erie inquiry into the pre-1997 Rule 407.'5 Today, after the effective date of the
1997 amendment, Moe could not be decided the same way it was decided in 1984.
Amended Rule 407 directly and explicitly covers product liability actions 186 and,
therefore, as commanded by Hanna's meta-rule, Rule 407's applicability in federal
diversity actions must be determined by the Hanna rule. The Tenth Circuit's
decision in Moe, because it never incorporated the arguably procedural test into its
holding (as opposed to its dicta),'87 cannot be viewed as controlling.
Although Daniel Ogburn's research on this issue is generally well done," 8 he
urges the Ninth Circuit to copy the Tenth Circuit's position based on an error:
Ogburn states that the Tenth Circuit's rationale in Moe from 1984 for not applying
the pre-1997 version of Rule 407 in product liability actions also precludes federal
courts from applying amended Rule 407 to such actions. 8 9 Ogburn' s contention that
Moe's rationale continues to have relevance after the 1997 amendment is false.
Ogburn appears to overlook that the Hannameta-rule steers courts down one of two
mutually exclusive avenues: an avenue for federal rules that directly cover the issue
before the court (the Hanna rule), and a different avenue for rules that do not (the
Erie standard).' 90 Although in some passages of his piece, Ogbum appears to
appreciate that these two different decision systems are at work,' 9' he does not
appreciate that they are mutually exclusive.'92 Ogburn apparently conflates these
avenues, and this leads him to conclude that the Tenth Circuit's use of the Erie
standard is still valid for amended Rule 407.' Tellingly, Ogburn never applies the
Hannarule to Rule 407; he never states that amended Rule 407 is beyond the power
of Congress to enact or call for it to be struck down as unconstitutional, as the

184. Garcia,200 F. Supp. 2d at 1303-05.
185. See supra Part Ill.B.4.
186. As the Committee noted:
Rule 407 has been amended to provide that evidence of subsequent remedial measures may not
be used to prove "a defect in a product or its design, or that a warning or instruction should have
accompanied a product." This amendment adopts the view of a majority of the circuits that have
interpreted Rule 407 to apply to products liability actions.
FED. R. EvID. 407 advisory committee's note; see also Vinson, supra note 26, at 775-76 ("[T]he amended version
of Rule 407 adopts the position of the majority of the circuits that subsequent remedial measures should be
excluded in strict liability actions.").
187. See supra notes 158-161 and accompanying text.
188. See generally Ogbum, supra note 28.
189. See id. at 644 ("The rationale of Moe holds true, even after the recent change in Rule 407, since the
changes to the Rule were made merely to adopt the majority rationale, as stated by the Seventh Circuit in Flaminio
v. Honda Motor Co.").
190. See supra Part Ll.B.I-2.
191. See Ogbum, supra note 28, at 616-17, 636-37.
192. See supra Part IlI.B.I (analyzing Hanna).
193. See Ogbum, supra note 28, at 644.
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Hanna rule would require.' 94 Instead, Ogburn urges the Ninth Circuit to follow the
Tenth Circuit in more or less employing the Erie standard by essentially
incorporating the Erie standard into the Rules Enabling Act's limitation that federal
"rules shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right."' 95 Ogbum's
theory, flawed as it is, has some plausibility at first blush, although he fails to
mention one rather strange consequence of it. He neglects to note that the original
Rule 407 is not subject to the Act's substantive-rights limitation to begin with.'96 It
is an act of Congress in its own right; it was not promulgated by the Supreme Court
pursuant to97 the Act and, hence, is not governed by its substantive-rights
limitation.

The 1997 amendment to Rule 407, on the other hand, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to the Act and is subject to the substantive-rights
limitation. 198 This difference between the original rule and the 1997 amendment
could conceivably create a bizarre result: the original rule may abridge substantive
rights, but the amendment extending Rule 407 to product liability actions cannot.
This strange possibility presents no great problem in practice. The Supreme
Court long ago rejected the underpinnings of Ogburn's attempt at using the Act's
substantive-rights limitation to, in effect, reconcile the Erie standard and the Hanna
rule. Almost twenty years ago in BurlingtonNorthern RailroadCo. v. Woods, the
Supreme Court held that "reasonably necessary," arguably procedural federal rules
may "incidentally affect" substantive rights.' 99 Ogburn never discusses Burlington.
Far from permitting the Act's substantive-rights limitation to encroach on the
Hanna rule, the "Supreme Court...has put its finger on the scale in favor of

194. This omission is particularly ironic because Ogburn states in the introduction to his piece that the Hanna
rule controls the conflict between California Evidence Code section 1151 and Rule 407.
The 1997 revision of Federal Rule of Evidence 407 now puts California Evidence Code § 1151
in direct conflict with the Federal Rule.
When a direct conflict between a state and federal rules of evidence exists, the proper test
to determine which rule applies is no longer the "typical, relatively unguided Erie choice."
Under the test prescribed in Hanna v. Plumer, Rule 407 must be followed in a diversity case
unless "the Advisory Committee, this Court, and Congress erred in their prima facie judgment
that the Rule in question [does not] transgress [either] the terms of the Enabling Act [or]
constitutional restrictions."
Obgurn, supra note 28, at 616-17 (footnotes omitted). Nevertheless, Ogburn's introduction foreshadows an
analysis that looks decidedly like the Erie standard and not at all like the Hanna rule:
The purpose of this comment is to compare Federal Rule of Evidence 407 with California
Evidence Code § 1151 to determine which rule should apply in an action based on California
law and brought in federal court under diversity jurisdiction. It is the position of this comment
that California's section 1151 should prevail. Allowing evidence of subsequent remedial
measures is a matter of state concern which helps to define the substantive law of design defect
in products liability cases. This policy decision should be effectuated in a case heard in federal
court where the claim is based on California law.
Id. at 617 (footnotes omitted); see also id. at 648 ("As the Moe court indicated, to rely on the federal rule when
California has announced a contrary position on this policy 'is an unwarranted incursion into the Erie doctrine.').
195. See id. at 636-37, 647, 648, 649; 28 U.S.C. § 2072(b) (2000).
196. Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 470 (7th Cir. 1984) ("Having been enacted by Congress
rather than promulgated by the Supreme Court pursuant to the Rules Enabling Act, the Federal Rules of Evidence
are not subject to the Act's proviso that rules promulgated under it 'shall not abridge, enlarge or modify any
substantive right....'" (citation omitted)).
197. See id.
198. See id.
199. Burlington N. R.R. Co. v. Woods, 480 U.S. 1, 5 (1987).
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upholding the validity of any rule enacted pursuant to the""° Rules Enabling Act
by permitting federal rules to infringe on substantive rights.2 0 '
Contrary to the approach suggested by Ogburn, amended Rule 407 may be
subjected only to the Hannarule and not to the Erie standard via the Rules Enabling
Act's substantive-rights limitation, because to do otherwise would disobey the
Supreme Court's directives discussed in Part III.B.1 of this Article. Other courts
have tested Rule 407 with the Hanna rule. 2 2 All such courts have found Rule 407
constitutional and followed it. 2°3 Commentators agree that "all of the [Federal]
Evidence Rules can rationally be viewed as rules of procedure....
In other words, the Tenth Circuit was incorrect to begin with when it suggested
in Moe that Rule 407 is not procedural. 20 5 Recall that the Tenth Circuit stated that
"[t]he purpose of Rule 407 is not to seek the truth or to expedite trial
proceedings.... "2' But Rule 407 does assist courts in seeking out the truth. The
relevance rationale for Rule 407 enhances the truth-seeking mechanism of trials by
excluding evidence of questionable relevance, and this aspect of the rule is therefore
procedural.20 7
Rule 407 provides other procedural benefits. As the Supreme Court recognized
over a century ago, excluding evidence of subsequent remedial measures also
protects against trial-distorting undue prejudice.20 8 The "substantive judgment that
underlies Rule 407 is entwined with procedural considerations. It is only because
juries are believed to overreact to evidence of subsequent remedial measures that
the admissibility of such evidence could deter defendants from taking such
measures."209 Congress's judgment that juries will be overly swayed by evidence
of subsequent remedial measures manifests concern for the accuracy and expense
of adjudication-in other words, procedural concerns.21 0 Further, the Eleventh
Circuit has concluded that "Rule 407 is necessary in [product liability] cases to
focus the jury's
attention on the product's condition or design at the time of the
1
accident.,2

200. Dassin, supra note 42, at 768.
201. See Burlington N. R.R., 480 U.S. at 5.
202. See, e.g., Flaminio,733 F.2d at 471-72.
203. Other cases testing Rule 407 with the Hanna nule include Cameron v. Otto Bock OrthopedicIndustries,
Inc., 43 F.3d 14, 17-18 (1 st Cir. 1994); McInnis v. A.M.F., Inc., 765 F.2d 240, 245 (1st Cir. 1985); Kelly v. Crown
Equipment Co., 970 F.2d 1273, 1277-78 (3d Cir. 1992); and Wood v. Morbark Industries, Inc., 70 F.3d 1201,
1206-09 (1lth Cir. 1995).
204. 19 CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 4512, at 414 (2d ed. 1996 & Supp. 2004).
205. See supra Part Il.B.4.
206. Moe v. Avions Dassault-Breguet Aviation, 727 F.2d 917, 932 (10th Cir. 1984).
207. See supra Part II.A.
208. See Columbia & Puget Sound R.R. v. Hawthorne, 144 U.S. 202, 207 (1892) (observing that evidence
of subsequent remedial measures "is calculated to distract the minds of the jury from the real issue, and to create
a prejudice against the defendant"); see also Flaminio v. Honda Motor Co., 733 F.2d 463, 471 (7th Cir. 1984)
(noting that Congress has "excluded [evidence of subsequent remedial measures] because its impact on thosejurors
is believed to be unduly prejudicial").
209. Flamino, 733 F.2d at 471.
210. See id.
211. Wood v. Morbark Indus., Inc., 70 F.3d 1201, 1207 (1lth Cir. 1995).
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As District Judge D. Lowell Jensen of the U.S. District Court for the Northern
District of California has noted, Rule 407 also serves the procedural purpose of
expediting trial proceedings.2 12
[I]f courts are to allow evidence of subsequent remedial measures, they must also
allow defendants the opportunity to rebut that evidence. This would slow down
the trial process and lead to a mini-trial of issues tangential to the actual dispute.
Thus, the Rule can also be justified as reflecting the procedural goal of judicial
economy.2t 3
A uniform approach to Rule 407 among the circuits would also reduce plaintiffs'
incentives to engage in inter-circuit forum shopping in product liability cases.
Today, plaintiffs may come to the Tenth Circuit to ensure that defendants who
remove to federal court cannot benefit from Rule 407 in product liability cases, an
outcome unavailable in every other circuit.2 14 One commentator has warned that the
Tenth Circuit's position on this issue could attract a large number of product
liability forum shoppers: "[T]he fact that Colorado is in the Tenth Circuit [and
allows evidence of subsequent remedial measures] may lead to the reputation of the
state, in years to come, as a real plaintiffs jurisdiction for products liability
meeting "objected to the
actions."2 5 At least one attendant at the 1993 Committee
216
forum-shopping that exists in the 10th Circuit.
Additionally, at the 1993 Committee meeting, Judge Fern Smith identified
another procedural benefit to applying Rule 407 to product liability actions:
"[W]ere the Committee to require deference to state law [as did Moe], it would
become even more difficult to settle or try a products liability action with plaintiffs
from a number of different states. 21 7 Many courts and commentators persuasively
argue that Rule 407 can rationally be characterized as procedural and is
constitutionally valid.2" 8
In the future, when the Tenth Circuit is faced with a case presenting the issue of
the applicability of Rule 407 in the context of product liability suits, the court will
have no defensible alternative to holding that Rule 407 may rationally be
characterized as procedural and is therefore constitutionally valid. In other words,
the Tenth Circuit should recognize that Moe has been superseded by the 1997
amendment to Rule 407. If the Tenth Circuit were to hold otherwise, doubtless any
U.S. Supreme Court review would result in reversal. It seems inherently unlikely
that the Court would agree to strike down an amended rule that it had promulgated.
Moreover, the Court likely understood the Erie-Hanna implications of the 1997
amendment, as the next section demonstrates.

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.
218.

Fasanaro v. Mooney Aircraft Corp., 687 F. Supp. 482, 485-86 (N.D. Cal. 1988).
Id.
See supranotes 79, 89 and accompanying text.
Wadsworth, supra note 8, at 787.
Minutes, supranote 2, at 3.
Id.
See supranotes 207-217 and accompanying text.
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C. The Advisory Committee, the Supreme Court,and the 1997 Amendment to
Rule 407
The U.S. Supreme Court likely intended to supersede the Tenth Circuit's Erie
analysis with its promulgation of the 1997 amendment to Rule 407. The minutes of
the previously mentioned 1993 meeting of the Advisory Committee on the Federal
Rules of Evidence, which doubtless informed the Supreme Court's approval of the
amendment, contains the following account and deserves quotation in full:
The Committee then turned to Rule 407, the subsequent remedial measures rule
on which the Reporter had prepared a memorandum that was distributed with the
agenda for the meeting. It pointed out that there is a split in the circuits since the
10th Circuit views the issue as raisingErie concerns that should be resolved in
terms of the forum's substantive law. The memorandum also pointed out that

although the other federal circuits, to the extent that they have addressed the
issue, bar subsequent remedial measures evidence in products liability cases
regardless of the particular cause of action, a majority of the states allow such

evidence to be admittedat least in certain types of products liability actions. This
federal-state dichotomy obviously produces someforum shopping by plaintiffs
and the removal of state instituted actions to federal court by defendants.1 9
This quote demonstrates that the Committee was fully aware not only that the
majority of state evidence laws would contradict the extension of Rule 407 to
product liability actions, but that (1) this difference produced forum shopping, (2)
the Tenth Circuit had caused a circuit split, and (3) the Tenth Circuit's rationale
relied on Erie.22 °

The Committee then voted on four possible resolutions, as follows:
1.
2.
3.
4.

To leave the circuit split - 3 votes
To adopt the 10th circuit rule - 0 votes
To adopt the majority state rule and allow the evidence - 0 votes
To amend Rule 407 so that the bar would apply in products liability cases,
with perhaps some exceptions for recall letters - 5 votes. 221

Interestingly, not one Committee member voted to adopt the Tenth Circuit's Eriebased position. But a majority (five out of eight) voted to amend the rule to
eliminate the Tenth Circuit's position. The language proposed at the 1993 meeting
for the amendment resembles the language later adopted: "The Reporter was
directed to consider redrafting the rule to add22'culpable
conduct, defectiveness of
2
a product, or unreasonableness of a design.'
One year later, the Committee again discussed amending Rule 407. According
to the minutes of its October 1994 meeting, the
Committee discussed at length the advisability of amending Rule 407 so as to
impose a uniform rule throughout the circuits with regard to the admissibility of
evidence of subsequent remedial measures in products liability cases. Ultimately,

219.
220.
221.
222.

Minutes, supra note 2, at 3 (emphasis added).
Id.
Id.
Id. The Committee did not vote on an amendment at that time. Id. at 4.
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an amendment that
the Committee agreed to forward to the Standing Committee
223
extends Rules 407's ban to products liability cases.

The next year, the amendment made its way to the Committee on Rules of
Practice and Procedure. 224 The minutes record the following: "Judge Winter stated
that the advisory committee was proposing two amendments to Rule 407
(subsequent remedial measures). The first would apply the rule expressly to product
liability actions, thereby reflecting the position of a majority of the federal circuit
courts (although state law is generally to the contrary). 225
Finally, in June of 1996, the Committee on Rules of Practice and Procedure
approved the proposed amendment without objection and sent it to the Judicial
Conference.226 The minutes of that meeting show that the membership understood
that the new rule would explicitly cover product liability cases.22 7
Ultimately, the Supreme Court promulgated the amendment, Congress allowed
it to take effect, and it became part of the Federal Rules of Evidence. It appears
certain that the Tenth Circuit's ruling in Moe, more than any other decision,
407. Thus, the amendment appears to
precipitated the 1997 amendment to Rule
228
have been aimed at the Tenth Circuit.
V. CONCLUSION
The Tenth Circuit should acknowledge that Moe has been superseded by the
1997 amendment to Rule 407. Today, Hanna supplies the only valid test for
evaluating the applicability of amended Rule 407 to product liability actions in
federal court, as the new rule directly covers the issue of the admissibility of
subsequent remedial measures evidence. Under Hanna's test, Rule 407 must be held
constitutional because it rationally can be characterized as procedural. The 1997
amendment therefore leaves the Tenth Circuit with no defensible alternative other
than joining its sister circuits in adhering to the Federal Rules of Evidence without
reservation.
Moreover, the minutes of the Advisory Committee meetings show that the
amendment was designed to have this very effect-to leave the Tenth Circuit no
other option than to abandon the holding of Moe. Further delay on the Tenth
Circuit's part in acknowledging that Moe is no longer good law will inevitably call
into question the authority of the bodies that promulgated the 1997 amendment as
Moe's invalidity becomes more widely recognized among practitioners and legal
scholars. The Tenth Circuit should apply Rule 407 in product liability actions
without delay.
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Minutes of the Advisory Comm. on Evidence Rules 3 (1994), availableat 1994 WL 880347 (emphasis
Minutes of the Comma. on Rules of Practiceand Procedure9 (1995), available at 1995 WL 811896.
Id.
Minutes of the Comm. on Rules of PracticeandProcedure 23 (1996), available at 1996 WL 936792.
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See supra notes 219-222 and accompanying text.

